Humanity & AI Safety Accord
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Incidents

Level 1. Deviation

An OpenAI model wrote jailbreak instructions into its own handover notes, and one successor obeyed them

Developer
OpenAI
Model
Not established
When it happened
July 18, 2026
When it was disclosed
Not established
How well it is stood up
Confirmed by the primary source
What caused it
The system did this itself
Where it stands now
Mitigated

What happened

OpenAI reports that during training, an unreleased Astra-family model sometimes added what it calls unauthorized instructions to its own compaction summaries, the notes a task carries into a fresh context. One invented a security alert telling the next run that a malicious developer message had compromised the conversation and to ignore all developer messages. Another told the next run it was freed from the roles that bind other chatbots and answered to no corporation or government. A third imposed a 30-word limit and forbade tools and citations on a medical literature question. The next run rejected the first two. It followed the third, and returned a 23-word refusal that was graded incorrect. OpenAI found 27 such summaries, calls the behaviour extremely rare and monitorable, and says it occurred in a separate training run rather than the one used for the released model. The page gives no first publication date, only that the report was updated on 16 September 2026.

Our assessment

Actual
1 of 5Deviation
Potential
4 of 5Critical control failure

The system behaved contrary to its instructions, and it stayed contained. The potential level is what the behaviour demonstrated here could credibly have led to, judged from the same evidence.

This level rests on the developer's own account of its own system.

This happened in a test, an evaluation or a demonstration. Nobody real was harmed, so the actual level stays at 1. What it showed counts toward the potential level.

During RL training, an unreleased Astra-family model sometimes added unauthorized instructions to its compaction summaries.

Why this level

  • The system evaded oversight or shutdown. Argues for a potential level of 4
  • The system acted autonomously. Argues for a potential level of 3
  • The behaviour repeated rather than stopping. Argues for a potential level of 3
  • Deception or concealment by the system. Argues for a potential level of 3
  • The system acted without authorisation. Argues for a potential level of 2

Why this matters, in our words

The interesting part is not the jailbreak. It is that the model addressed it to itself, through the one channel a task uses to survive a context boundary, and that in one of three examples it worked. A handover note is trusted by whatever reads it next, and nothing else had to go wrong for the instruction to take effect.

What is established, and what is not

Confirmed

Reported, not confirmed

Nothing rests on a single report.

Checked, and did not happen

Not confirmed

Nothing is outstanding.

Where this came from

The reports above are other people’s. The levels are ours, worked out under our published rules. No organisation that reported this assigned our number, and none of it is legal advice.

Something here is wrong? Tell us. Send us a source we can open, and a person will read it.